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I. ABSTRACT  
 
It’s no secret that the world is quickly shifting from the nightly news 
and the daily paper to a 24/7 rapid-response information environment 
driven by smartphones and other personal computing devices. Also readily 
apparent is the hyper-partisanship that has come to mire America’s 
legislative process. This paper will explore the connection between the two 
phenomena by reviewing a mix of academic and popular literature and 
conducting an original experiment to arrive at a better understanding of how 
Internet-mediated communication technologies drive political opinions at 
the individual level. Specifically, statistical analyses are performed to parse 
out the differences between being presented with information in the form of 
tweets and being presented with information in the form of an article. While 
the findings suggest that there is no significant difference between tweets 
and articles in terms of issue polarization, a closer inspection reveals that 
formatting coupled with ideologically filtered points-of-view has 
implications for learning about, becoming interested in, and engaging with 
hot-button political issues. 
 
Keywords: James Bradbury; undergraduate thesis; political science; 
University of Colorado Boulder; American politics; polarization; media; 
Internet; news; information; MSNBC, Fox News, Twitter; Facebook; 
Google;  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
I. Abstract .............................................................................................. i 
II. Introduction ...................................................................................... 1 
III. Background Information ................................................................... 2 
A. The Value of Ideological Diversity ......................................... 2 
B. Polarization Theories .............................................................. 3 
C. A Series of Tubes..................................................................... 5 
D. Evil Empires? .......................................................................... 6 
E. Revenue Models ...................................................................... 8 
F. @Grandma .............................................................................. 9 
IV. Literature Review .............................................................................. 9 
A. Partisan Media ........................................................................ 9 
B. Information Enclaves ............................................................. 10 
C. This is Your Brain Online ..................................................... 11 
D. Old Content, New Challenges .............................................. 12 
V. Theory and Hypotheses ................................................................... 12 
VI. Research Design .............................................................................. 14 
VII. Data Analysis ................................................................................... 18 
A. Population Demographics ..................................................... 18 
B. Concerning Hypothesis One ................................................. 19 
C. Concerning Hypothesis Two ................................................. 20 
i. Figure 1 ....................................................................... 21 
ii. Figure 2 ....................................................................... 23 
D. Additional Findings ............................................................... 23 
i. Figure 3 ....................................................................... 24 
ii. Figure 4 ....................................................................... 25 
iii. Figure 5 ....................................................................... 26 
iv. Figure 6 ....................................................................... 28 
VIII. Conclusions ..................................................................................... 28 
IX. Acknowledgements .......................................................................... 29 
X. Works Cited .................................................................................... 30 
XI. Appendix ......................................................................................... 35 
A. Experiment Questions and Visuals ........................................ 35 
B. Geographical Map of Respondents ....................................... 53 
C. Approval Letter from IRB ..................................................... 54 
 	  
	   1 
II. INTRODUCTION 
 
Anticipation had been building for months. After the trips to Iowa, the 
fundraising dinners, the exploratory committees, and increasingly frequent 
media appearances, there was not really any question about who was eyeing a 
run for president of the United States in 2016. Rather, in this strategic 
“invisible primary,” the question was who would be first? The pundits got their 
answer just after midnight on March 23, 2015 when Ted Cruz, the firebrand 
Texas junior senator announced: “I’m running for President and I hope to 
earn your support!” (Cruz 2015). The message, accompanied by a 30-second 
video of sprawling landscapes and a smiling cross section of Americans, was 
hardly original, but the platform bucked a trend in the long history of 
presidential campaign launches—it happened on Twitter.  
The ubiquitous social network, popularized first by the likes of movie 
stars and professional athletes has, since its creation in March of 2006, grown 
to over 288 million monthly active users, including 100 percent of United 
States senators, and 99.1 percent of members of the House of Representatives 
(Twitter 2015). With the maximum length of a post only 140 characters, the 
microblogging site offers a distinct contrast to more established media and 
dominates conversations on the state of contemporary journalism, due in part 
to its restrictive form. In fact, this author gets the majority of his daily news 
via an iPhone through outlets he “follows” on Twitter. Realizing how 
dependent he, and so many others, has become on using the service helped 
inspire this thesis.  
“So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual 
animosities,” James Madison remarked, “that where no substantial occasion 
presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient 
to kindle their unfriendly passions…” (Madison 1787, 201). Were our fourth 
president alive today, he would doubtless discover social networking sites, 
news aggregators, and the Internet more broadly, to be tools that easily allow 
the flames of political discord to fan.  
Pursuing this thesis about the effects of the Internet on American 
politics stems from the idea that a modern individual can feel very well- 
informed about current events without ever picking up a printed daily paper 
or watching the nightly news. How can that be? The answer lies in the 
changing nature of communications technology. For a growing number of 
people, their primary source of political information is one being shaped by 
forces unlike any in “traditional” media. This project serves to uncover those 
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unique characteristics of how news is consumed in the digital age, and to 
examine its effects on partisanship among the American electorate. Over the 
past decade-plus, the means through which information is disseminated to a 
mass audience has undergone a radical transformation, as has the presence of 
an ideological divide between the two major political parties in the United 
States. While there is no suggestion that the former holds all of the 
explanatory power over the latter, they most certainly present a relationship 
worth exploring. The objective of this work is at once reflective and forward-
looking. This paper hopes to show how the ways in which we navigate our 
political universe are changing due to shifting communications preferences, 
and offer a glimpse into the future of constituencies with hyper-personalized 
sources of information. 
These goals will be accomplished by beginning with a background on 
topics that are foundational to these research interests before then moving 
into a review of the existing academic literature. Next, theory and hypotheses 
will be discussed and operationalized using an originally designed experiment. 
Following the experiment, data will be applied to models and analyzed so that 
conclusions may be drawn that tie back to assumptions outlined in the pre-
experiment hypotheses. Finally, these findings will be extrapolated to 
comment on the future of American politics and propose steps we can take to 
combat, as Madison mentioned, those kindling animosities.  
Formally, the question this paper seeks to answer is: how does Internet-
mediated political information influence one’s strength of partisanship? 
Before long, it seems, almost everyone in America will use online sources as 
their primary means of learning about the world. Answering this question is 
essential so that citizens may become more critical consumers of political 
news, content providers may better understand how they shape society, and 
future political scientists may have a greater pool of data from which to 
further their own studies. 
 
III. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
The Value of Ideological Diversity 
 
 The discussion begins with an excerpt from John Stuart Mill’s On 
Liberty, the philosopher and political economist’s powerful mid-nineteenth 
century defense of civil rights, free speech chief among them. While many 
passages speak to our current state of political discourse, the following rings 
especially true: 
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Unless opinions favorable to democracy and aristocracy, to property and 
to equality, to cooperation and to competition, to luxury and to 
abstinence, to sociality and individuality, to liberty and discipline, and 
all the other standing antagonisms of practical life, are expressed with 
equal freedom, and enforced and defended with equal talent and 
energy, there is no chance of both elements obtaining their due; one 
scale is sure to go up, and the other down. Truth, in the great practical 
concerns of life, is a question of the reconciling and combining of 
opposites… (Mill 1859, 49) 
 
 In a society with such myriad political interests as the modern-day 
United States, recognizing that another person thinks differently than you do, 
and being willing to compromise with him is paramount to the long-term 
health of the society. Another monumental work in that vein is Walter 
Lippmann’s Public Opinion. Written in 1922, his main claim applies an 
everyday lens to Mill’s high-minded philosophy. Lippmann says that men 
cannot obtain or even comprehend a perfect variety of information; that 
judgments must be made using stereotypes, akin to sailors using scaled maps 
to navigate the ocean (Lippmann 1922, 11). We are hardly living in a time of 
information scarcity, but nearly a hundred years after Public Opinion, the 
challenge of separating wheat from chaff—fair analysis from click-bait—
remains. The whole of the World Wide Web houses the most complete 
collection of information in human history, yet as is expand upon in the 
sections to come, it does not appear that the medium is conducive for 
allowing individuals to encounter a healthy diversity of opinion. Instead, 
caricatures of opposing viewpoints get created and used for judgment, which 
hardens opinions and discourages compromise. 
 
Polarization Theories 
 
The 112th United States Congress, at the time of this writing the most 
recent session for which DW-NOMINATE scores are available, was the 
most polarized in history (Matthews 2013). While the thrust of the argument 
in this thesis is that Internet-mediated political information contributes to the 
formation of extreme opinions in the American electorate, it would be 
negligent to suggest that this relationship explains the entire, or even a 
majority, of the polarization narrative. There are many strong arguments to be 
made that the American political process has become polarized by offline 
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factors. One school of thought describes constituent-driven polarization. In 
The Big Sort, journalist Bill Bishop discusses how since the late 1970s people 
have been steadily relocating and grouping their physical selves into areas with 
like-minded people and become more insulated from dissenting opinions as a 
result (Bishop 2004). The idea is that citizens look to their neighbors as a 
point of reference for what are “normal” political beliefs, and when those 
beliefs are related, differing opinions come across as foreign and fringe.  
Other well-advanced hypotheses suggest that polarization is largely 
elite-driven, that changes in legislative procedures and congressional behavior 
have pushed people to the ideological poles (Theriault 2008). Others that 
subscribe to a “rules of the game” hypothesis think that the root cause of 
dysfunction in American government is actually the very framework of   U.S. 
government itself (Toobin 2013, 64). A third, hybrid theory, says that the 
preferences of the electorate and the policies of lawmakers work in tandem. A 
2006 book, Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches 
advocates that political polarization and income inequality rise together and 
feed off of each other to create an increasingly disparate citizenry (McCarty 
et. al 2008). With the not-so-distant Occupy Wall Street movement behind 
us, and budding 2016 campaign rhetoric about wealth redistribution, 
McCarty et al. have a theory that deserves continued consideration. 
Still, not all political scientists agree that there is substantial 
polarization taking place in American politics. One of the most well known 
critics is Morris P. Fiorina, a Stanford professor who argues that the chasm 
between your average Democrat and Republican citizen is not as wide as the 
media would have you believe. His take is that citizens appear but actually are 
not polarized because they have to make false choices between two continually 
drifting ideologies (Fiorina 2011). Georgetown professor Hans Noel makes a 
similar argument against “real” polarization. He finds that while a clear divide 
between liberal and conservative representatives exists today, it has always 
existed, just not in such a clean manner. For example, in the mid-20th century, 
Democrats in the southern United States were more ideologically conservative 
than northern Republicans. So, when legislation like establishing Medicaid 
passed with “bipartisan” support, that’s because ideologically consistent people 
voted together and they happened to be from different parties (Noel 2014). 
As many more political scientists point out, if one is to look at the American 
political system as a whole, he would find that most people are ideologically 
close to each other. At the individual level however, significant differences on 
salient issues (i.e. abortion, same-sex marriage, taxes, war) create a perception 
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that the political left and right are wildly dissimilar (Hetherington and Weiler 
2009, 32).  
That perception appears to be very important. In a recent report from 
the Pew Research Center, Political Polarization in the American Public, 
researchers found that indeed, the majority of Americans do not hold 
uniformly liberal or conservative values, but that those same people are 
disengaged with the political process. Unsurprisingly, it is highly partisan 
people that are motivated to participate in politics and make their voices 
heard. These individuals comprise the minority that drives the national 
political discussion (Pew Research Center 2014c, 8). For the purposes of this 
project, focus will be paid to citizen-driven rather than elite-driven 
polarization, and will pay particular attention to the highly active pockets of 
actors entrenched in ideology.  
 
A Series of Tubes 
 
Nowhere is the ability to isolate one’s self from ideological conflict 
more possible than the Internet. Born from Cold War fears of a nuclear 
attack capable of crippling the nation’s intelligence, the U.S Department of 
Defense created the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network 
(ARPANET), which delivered its first message in 1969. ARPANET was 
built as a distributed, decentralized network that sent information across the 
country by breaking it up into packets so the whole system could survive if 
one of its nodes, or, computer hubs, were to be destroyed (Galloway 2004, 5). 
Slowly, as Soviet fears began to subside, different universities gained access to 
this information repository. In 1991, Swiss computer programmer Tim 
Berners-Lee invented the World Wide Web, which is what most people 
know the “Internet” to be. Today, this atypical information system—more 
like an interstate highway of knowledge than a single road—is seeing more 
traffic than ever before, and continues to transform politics. More than a 
decade ago, political scientist Bruce Bimber wrote of the Internet, “at no time 
in the history of American democracy has a new set of communication and 
information-handling capacities been assimilated so rapidly by the political 
system” (Bimber 2003, 1). 
Since essentially any media can be converted into binary code and sent 
at instant speeds, many scholars insist that the Internet is the be-all end-all of 
communications networks. But has this story not been written before? As 
Columbia Law School professor Tim Wu discusses in his book The Master 
Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires, technologies from telephones 
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to TVs were all thought to be impossible to supplant and resistant to 
centralization. Wu’s hypothesis is that given enough time, the Internet will 
mature, like it’s communication brethren, into a centralized, even 
corporatized, entity where power is wrested from content users and into the 
hands of content providers (Wu 2011). As the legal scholar Lawrence Lessig 
lamented at the turn of the twenty-first century, the Internet is becoming less 
politically free all the time, and average people are doing nothing about it 
(Lessig 2001, 268). One needn’t look further than recent net neutrality action 
to grasp the political consequences that Lessig and Wu address (Federal 
Communications Commission 2015, 3). 
As the Internet continues to become regarded more like an essential 
utility than a superfluous luxury, experts have considered a stunning variety of 
advancements to come. In a 2014 survey for Pew’s Internet Project, entitled 
“Digital Life in 2025,” it was asserted that most people have not yet noticed 
the societally relevant changes taking place in our communications networks; 
As the difference between our on and offline selves becomes transparent, 
networks will become even more disruptive (Pew Research Center 2014b). As 
Robert Putnam put it back in his book Bowling Alone: The Collapse and 
Revival of American Community, “…the possibility of even more narrowly 
focused communities in cyberspace [turning] into reality will depend in large 
part on how the ‘virtual’ facet of our lives fits into our broader social reality as 
well as our fundamental values” (Putnam 2000, 178). This thesis will not 
elaborate further on the founding or structure of the Internet, but in sections 
to come, we will grapple with understanding how the line between one’s 
virtual and real life identity is fading, and what it means for consuming 
political information. 
 
Evil Empires? 
 
 Tracking with the rapid expansion of social media use across America 
(Brenner and Smith 2013), a wealth of information has sprung-up about the 
presence and effects of algorithms operating within sites like Facebook and 
Google. Even at the dawn of the 21st century, when commercial search 
engines were still in their infancy and effective online social networking was 
little more than a dream, law professor, and eventual head of the White 
House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) Cass Sunstein 
published his book Republic.com. In it, Sunstein advances a prescient account 
of the future of communications in an increasingly personalized world, where 
code would come to segregate people based on their existing beliefs (Sunstein 
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2002). The premise is simple: there is so much information on the Internet 
that computerized rules are necessary to sort it all, and that customizable rules 
allow users to filter what they do and do not want to see. Making sure users 
see exactly what they want as quickly as possible drives innovation at Internet 
firms that live-or-die by the strength of their algorithms, their abilities to use 
“search engines [to] supplement the limited human brain” (Auletta 2010, 40).  
A leading critic of the way information is communicated online, Eli 
Pariser explains that the web has become so increasingly personalized and 
sophisticated at selecting the information you “want” to see, that two people 
searching for the same term will not get the same results. He calls this the 
“filter bubble,” whereby computer algorithms have replaced human editors in 
the news process (Pariser 2012). While exceedingly useful if you want to 
search for “pizza near me,” the automatic nature of search is potentially 
worrisome for those of us who rely on Internet-based information curators for 
our political news and opinion. Just like the neighborhood dynamic that 
Bishop outlined, self-selecting sources of online information leads people to 
distrust what is not in-line with “their news” or “their facts” (Johnson 2012, 
55). This is a considerable area of concern as people move into digital-only 
and mobile-first news. More and more studies show that when people get 
their political views tied up in factual beliefs, the coupling is difficult to undo 
regardless of the messaging (Nyhan 2014).  
For all its pitfalls, though, digital democracy has proven effective at 
producing positive political change. Facebook has become one of the first 
places dissatisfied people go to voice their opinions. Its viral communication 
tools enable large groups of people to join together quickly (Kirkpatrick 2010, 
290). Twitter too has found its place in political discussion, serving as a way 
for citizens to interact with candidates and leaders, but also to interact with 
each other to discuss views. For example, during the first 2012 Obama-
Romney presidential debate, there were 158,690 tweets per minute related to 
the event and people who tweeted paid more attention and thought the event 
was more important than those who did not (Houston, et al. 2013, 302). 
Google is also doing their part by offering different APIs for those interested 
in “civic tech,” and promoting YouTube as a channel for learning about issues 
from all sides (Levy 2011, 318). People can’t be forced to encounter opinions 
different from their own, but it’s heartening to know that organizations with 
the power to control information are aware of the problem and trying to fight 
back. Vital to the research of this thesis, the arguments outlined in this 
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section will not be developed further, and will instead be used as theoretical 
underpinning.  
 
Revenue Models 
 
 If the future of communication promises to exist through screens, then 
it is worthwhile to take a look at the ways that are being upended. It’s no 
secret that newspapers make almost all of their money in two ways: selling 
subscriptions and selling advertising space. With the increasing popularity of 
the Internet, many people are just not willing to pay for news anymore when 
there is so much “free” information out there. The thought is that your 
everyday person is willing to sacrifice a bit of quality from an established, but 
costly news source like The Rocky Mountain News, and substitute it with a 
cheaper, more-frills alternative like BuzzFeed. This causes subscriptions to 
decline. More critically, sites like Craigslist poach a large share of people who 
would have purchased a block in the once-profitable classifieds section of a 
daily paper. This causes a massive change in revenue models for print media. 
In 2003, The New York Times made just over 27 percent of their revenue from 
circulation. Fast-forward ten years, and the “Paper of Record” now relies on 
circulation for roughly 50 percent of their total revenue (Bach 2014). To 
make matters more dire, circulation numbers are falling, and even with 
evolving online paywall models, revenues look headed for significant declines.  
 But neither the demand for information nor the money that 
accompanies it is disappearing. Instead, it’s being redistributed to giants like 
Google and Facebook. To get a sense of the volume, consider that in 2011, 
Wired reported that Google was making $3 billion a month in advertising and 
that it accounted for 97 percent of their revenue (Singel 2011). Facebook has 
also beefed-up their advertising offerings in recent years. Why does this 
matter? It matters because the future of political discourse is deeply tied to the 
quickly evolving promise of the Internet. With its user-first founding and 
ability to make the world’s information easily accessible, people, in theory, 
ought to become more highly-educated, and willing to entertain opposing 
points of view without feeling obligated to accept them, as the oft-used 
Aristotle quote suggests. Yet, with the abundance of information on the 
Internet, people are reluctant to pay for it—in the traditional sense. Nobody 
has, nor one would suspect ever will, need to fork over his hard-earned cash to 
type a query into a search bar. But he, we, all of us are paying with our 
information. Every time somebody clicks on a sensationalizing link or 
targeted advertisement, the content provider gets an untold number of data 
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points about you. Big data and politics is a dissertation topic in and of itself, 
but it is necessary to have a tacit understanding of the motivations of content 
providers before taking any steps to analyze the byproducts of their world.  
 
@Grandma 
 
 It has become a favorite scene for producers of popular culture: a 
technologically inept “old person” has trouble with the basic operations of his 
cell phone while a teenage family member texts and surfs circles around him. 
One of my grandmothers has never owned a personal computer, so yes, there 
may be some teeth to this stereotype. But do you know what my grandma 
always does? She votes—and so do her friends. According to the Census 
Bureau, 72 percent of citizens ages 65 and over voted in the 2012 presidential 
election. That same year, 45 percent of citizens between the ages of 18 and 29 
cast a ballot. Looking at sheer turnout, that’s a difference of 9.1 million votes 
in favor of the older population (File 2014, 5). Another statistic worth 
highlighting is that as of January 2014, 97 percent of Americans between the 
ages of 18 and 29 use the Internet, while only 57 percent of those over the age 
of 65 do (Pew Research Center 2014a). These facts and others like them are 
meaningful to this paper because whole blocks of politically active people will 
be unaccounted for in the hypotheses, and largely absent from the experiment. 
While recent studies suggest that 82 percent of Millennials get the majority of 
their news from online sources (Young 2015, 5), theories drawn from those 
reports face resistance, as many politically active people do not participate in 
online discussion like these “digital natives.” 
 
IV. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Partisan Media 
 
Whether or not you subscribe to any of the aforementioned ideas about 
polarization in America, there’s no denying that the news media plays an 
enormous role in educating the public and informing their opinions about 
current events. We live in an era of unprecedented choice when it comes to 
our news. The average home in the United States has access to 130 television 
channels (Arceneaux and Johnson 2013), and the plethora of news sites on 
the World Wide Web is, for all intents and purposes, unlimited. To make 
sense of navigating so much information, people have to make choices and 
selectively expose themselves to what they deem to be sources of high quality 
and low cognitive dissonance (Stroud 2011, 16). 
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Not long ago there began to be an increase in the number of partisan 
news sources that are clearly branded as coming from the political left or 
right. Today, Americans are consuming more of it than ever before 
(Levendusky 2013, 4). Theoretically, this would suggest that Americans are 
becoming more polarized as a result, but as Princeton political scientist 
Markus Prior has pointed out, the statistics are deceiving. He says that with 
the expansion of options many Americans just don’t tune into news at all 
(Prior 2007). He clarifies by saying that those who do are now able to select 
sources that fit more neatly with their political beliefs than they could have in 
the past (Prior 2013, 120). 
While sources concerning television have so far been used as a proxy for 
online media choice, scholarly work has been devoted to self-selectivity on the 
Internet itself. There have been many arguments laid out for different 
interpretations of the debate surrounding ideological segregation. Some say 
that the nature of social media and online news creates “echo chambers,” 
(Halberstam and Knight 2014), while others say with equal fervor that the 
Internet is no more likely to separate people than other offline mediums or 
face-to-face interactions (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2011, 813-816). It appears 
that the main disconnect between these two crowds is the scope of their work. 
Macroscopic approaches show little difference between the Internet and other 
mediums, while studies into Internet-specific processes such as social 
networking provides results that differentiate mediums more conclusively. 
 
Information Enclaves 
 
 To better illustrate the concept of a cloistered information 
environment, let’s assume a thought experiment. Suppose you are in a group 
of people you have not met before, and someone, Bill, brings up climate 
change. A set of arguments is put forth, and as it happens, you, Bill, and his 
buddies all have nearly identical views about the topic. You subconsciously 
want to avoid friction with these strangers, so even though they’re slightly 
more enthusiastic about some policy, you’re willing to accept it or at least not 
oppose it out loud. This seems like a very rational decision on your end, but it 
is also a classic example of the phenomenon known as “groupthink” (Sunstein 
2009, 32). In many forms of media, cable news most obviously, but the 
Internet too, people often find themselves surrounded by information that 
confirms their existing political beliefs. Yet, having a strong opinion is only a 
portion of what makes partisan media polarizing. A more pressing concern is 
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how the media influences one’s likelihood to compromise, or even place any 
value at all in opinions that are different than their own. 
 To help describe how subconscious decision-making effects outward 
actions, rely for a second on the social psychology principle that all reasoning 
is motivated. By that it is meant that political actors have two goals: being 
accurate and conforming to partisan beliefs. Even if one enters a setting trying 
to judge political positions in a completely objective manner, his implicit 
desire to act in ideological accordance with his preferred political party clouds 
his judgment (Taber and Lodge 2006, 756). Additional research has 
uncovered widespread agreement among researchers that partisan sources of 
information do in-fact polarize the electorate and politically active citizens 
more specifically. One of the especially alarming findings is a 2014 report by 
Pew that people are less likely to engage in online than offline political 
discussions and live in what’s termed a “spiral of silence” (Hampton et al. 
2014). This report points to conclusions that while social networking sites 
allow for more people to participate in politics, most are not doing so with a 
critical mind (Miller 2014). In this thesis, these established principles will be 
taken and used to explain experimental results.   
 
This is Your Brain Online 
 
There is a developing body of literature on the ways that the physical 
effects of the Internet are profoundly different than other mediums. Chief 
among those texts is Nicholas Carr’s book The Shallows: What the Internet is 
Doing to Our Brains. Carr, like others before him, takes a technological 
determinist’s view of the Internet, proposing that the technology has more 
control over us as humans than we do it. The most striking section is where 
Carr dives into biological studies and finds that browsing the Internet—with 
all the scanning, skimming, and multi-tasking—is re-wiring our brains’ 
neuroplasticity. He determines that yes, the Internet allows us to consume 
more information at a faster rate than ever before, but our ability to process all 
of that new information is dramatically weakened (Carr 2011, 141). Since the 
aim of this thesis is political in nature rather than strictly psychological, not 
many sources devoted to cognition have been encountered. The few texts on 
the subject seem to point to a conclusion that once somebody has chosen a 
source of (political) information and likes it, he becomes stuck in a kind of 
“habit loop” and is unlikely to change that source since visiting it has become 
engrained deeply in his brain at the basal ganglia level (Duhigg 2014, 15). In 
this (and the other ways described above and below) the Internet is radically 
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different than “traditional” forms of media and lends itself very easily to 
politically polarizing behaviors. 
 
Old Content, New Challenges 
 
In 1964, Marshall McLuhan, the much ballyhooed media theorist, 
introduced a, at the time, radical hypothesis: “the medium is the message.” 
His take, that the way in which information is presented matters as much, if 
not more, than the content of the message (McLuhan 1964), transformed the 
ways people thought about communications technology. In conditions of 
email “daily digests,” and graphic-heavy Facebook posts, it would be absurd to 
suggest that people are consuming political information in the same way 
today as they were fifty (or even fifteen) years ago. Why does this matter? As 
McLuhan puts it, “The American stake in literacy as a technology or 
uniformity, applied to every level of education, government, industry, and 
social life is totally threatened by the electric technology.” (McLuhan 1964, 
32). If citizens refuse to acknowledge the possible effects of gleaning 
information from the @nytimes Twitter feed opposed to engrossing 
themselves in the physical paper, then they become subservient to the 
constraints of their preferred medium. Research has yet to yield a data-driven 
analysis of how the format of a piece of political information influences the 
extremity of one’s opinions. It stands to reason that consuming the same 
content in different ways can lead to a greater or lesser understanding of any 
topic—but reason isn’t good enough. This is the space where this thesis is 
going to be able to make the greatest contribution to the literature on the 
effects of Internet-mediated political information.  
 
V. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES   
Based on the perceived gaps in current academic work and growing 
interest in the effects that changing forms of news consumption have on the 
political process, the following hypotheses were devised: 
 
H0 The format of information that one consumes will have no effect on 
the strength of his political opinions. 
H1 Exposure to pieces of information presented as tweets will change 
one’s political opinions to a greater and more extreme degree than 
exposure to pieces of information presented as articles. 
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H2 Irrespective of format, exposure to ideologically filtered pieces of 
information will change one’s political opinions to a greater and more 
extreme degree than exposure to neutral pieces of information. 
 
In addition to the materials that have been reviewed, H1 stems from an 
understanding that due to not only the structure and hive mind mentality of 
the Internet, but the generally bloated nature of modern-day reporting, 
consumers are losing interest in lengthy sources of information (Kinsley 
2010). As stories become shorter, from multi-page articles to mere sentences, 
the same essential information needs to be expressed, but the amount of 
supporting facts and nuance will invariably decline. That would mean that if 
people consume a large volume of brief “headline style” bits of information 
(see: social media), they are encountering many more conclusions and 
opinions than if they were to consume the same volume of content composed 
of articles. To be sure, readers in a pre-Internet day could have picked up the 
Journal and just skimmed headlines, but at least it was clear to that person 
that the story continued past the headline. 
To survive in in a market saturated by one-liners, content producers 
and editors—if the editors exist in the first place—are obligated to make their 
presentation of the news different from their competitors. What results is 
what has been called “a skewed version of reality that impacts how editors 
think about what reporters should be covering, and what reporters think is 
important” (Cillizza 2013). Certainly consumers, especially young people, are 
finding what they’re after in the new information bazaar. In a March 2015 
study of Twitter users from the United Kingdom, the number one reason 
respondents said they want to use Twitter to learn about politics was because 
they can “get information in a simple-to-understand way.” In the same study, 
68 percent of respondents said they liked Twitter because they could learn 
“about issues that matter to me,” while 66 percent said the platform made 
politics “more interesting” (Geary 2015). Theoretically, this new 
environment, where value is measured by view time and clicks, is ripe for the 
rise of polarizing opinions.  
H2 is the result of many decades of political science research into the 
media and public opinion. If journalists are acting ethically and fulfilling their 
obligation to inform the public by supporting an open and civil exchange of 
views, information from objective sources, labeled in the below experimental 
design as “Neutral,” should not sway public opinion in a particular partisan 
direction (Society of Professional Journalists 2014). This should be true 
	  14 
regardless of the form the information takes, be it a hundred or a hundred 
thousand characters. In comparison, the goal of a partisan or otherwise 
ideological news source is to make an argument for the worldview that the 
author supports by presenting a cultivated selection of facts and little debate 
(Arceneaux and Johnson 2013, 33).  
Interaction effects between content ideology and form are expected to 
be powerful in the experiment. Given tweets, messages congruent with a 
respondent’s existing political beliefs will be more polarizing than either 
incongruent messages or neutral messages, while incongruent messages will be 
more polarizing than neutral messages. Given articles, congruent messages 
will still be more polarizing than incongruent or neutral messages, but the 
effect will be to a lesser degree than the corresponding content that was 
format as a tweet. Similarly, incongruent messages will be more polarizing 
than neutral messages, yet, less effective at changing opinion than if presented 
as tweets. 
 
VI. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
In order to test hypotheses about content length and ideology, it is only 
natural that one turns to Twitter. Using existing tweets and content linked 
through the site, an original experiment was designed and conducted. This 
option was elected because many academics that write about media choice and 
partisanship have noted how difficult it is to establish causality and/or say 
with a degree of reliability that there are not spurious effects at work. By 
nature, a well-designed experiment makes it impossible for a dependent 
variable to cause an independent variable, and random assignment renders 
confounding variables moot (Kellstedt and Whitten 2013, 75). 
In the experiment there are a total of eight different treatments, and 
each participant is randomly assigned to one of them: 
 
 Liberal Neutral Conservative Apolitical 
Tweet S1 S2 S3 S4 
Article S5 S6 S7 S8 
 
The columns show the ideological bent of political information that a 
person is shown. “Liberal” corresponds to information from a source like 
MSNBC, “Conservative” corresponds to information from a source like Fox 
News, and “Neutral” corresponds to information from a source like the BBC. 
“Apolitical” information—by definition something with no relation to 
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politics, either in content or ideology—is represented by information from 
ESPN about Peyton Manning breaking the all-time NFL record for passing 
touchdowns. This serves as a control group and baseline for measuring effects 
of political stimuli. In order to be as objective as possible when assigning 
sources of information to represent political ideologies, a recent study from 
Pew Research Center, “Political Polarization & Media Habits,” was used. 
From their data a list of nine news outlets that correspond well to a wide 
distribution of political ideologies was constructed. For American liberals: 
MSNBC (@msnbc), Al Jazeera America (@ajam), and Mother Jones 
(@MotherJones). For American conservatives: Fox News (@FoxNews), 
Breitbart (@BreitbartNews), and TheBlaze (@theblaze). For moderates: The 
New York Times (@nytimes), The Wall Street Journal (@WSJ), and BBC 
World News (@BBCWorld). Each source was ranked “more trusted than 
distrusted,” the best available rating, by the constituency that shares the 
ideology sources are assigned to represent (Pew Research Center 2014d, 18). 
For the purposes of the experiment, all “Liberal” pieces of information are 
attributed to MSNBC, all “Conservative” to Fox News, and all “Neutral” to 
BBC World News. Using the names of these three well-established and 
popular sources in conjunction with some content from lesser-known sources 
is done to help mitigate the potential effect of information being dismissed by 
a respondent because the source is unknown. 
Referring back to the above matrix, rows show the format of content 
that a participant interacted with. “Tweet” means that individual pieces of 
information about a given topic were presented as 140 characters or fewer, 
while “Article” means that the information was presented as an article with 
content closely linked with that of the tweets. To minimize variance, each 
person who completed the experiment was exposed to approximately 700 
characters of content. This means that a respondent encountered either five 
140-character tweets or one 700-character article. Of course, in the real 
world, articles are often much longer and tweets are consumed in various 
quantities, but compromises have to be made “in the lab.” If an “Article” was 
allowed to have twice as much content as a “Tweet,” it would be impossible to 
say which parts of the experiment were doing the heavy lifting in relation to 
the dependent variable. To make the experience as realistic as possible within 
these constraints, both tweets and article-length content were formatted to 
mimic actual website layouts using Adobe Photoshop CC (for visuals, please 
see the appendix of this paper). 
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To maintain as much consistency across the various treatment groups 
as possible, each piece of political information was about the same event: 
President Obama’s November 20, 2014 speech announcing his executive 
order on immigration. This issue was chosen for a number of reasons, but 
predominantly because the speech was the most recent major initiative of the 
Obama administration, and it sparks an argument that many people are 
familiar with and have come to a decision about personally. Also, since 
participants in the experiment may have recently considered the issue of 
immigration, they would be less inclined to change their opinions as the result 
of exposure to new information. This puts the burden of proof squarely on the 
experimental manipulations and makes for more reliable results.  
The reliability of the source manipulations can be somewhat questioned 
when it is taken into account what information each source displayed to a 
respondent. There are two potential causal mechanisms at work in this 
experiment. The first is the news organization that appears to the respondent 
as being responsible for writing the tweets or article, and the second is the 
content itself. For example, the way the experiment is set up, we cannot say 
for certain whether a respondent is reacting to the name, “Fox News,” or to 
the content, “…use of executive authority to halt deportations harms…” This 
issue could be resolved by only changing the names of sources from treatment 
to treatment and leaving the content the same for each. However, this would 
not test the hypotheses, would make the experiment much less robust, and 
may in the end even undermine its accuracy because participants would expect 
a certain brand of information from each news source, and when that 
expectation is not met, they may dismiss the experiment as wholly fictional.  
Another concern one might have is that the information presented in 
each treatment is not doing a good job translating a “liberal,” “neutral,” or 
“conservative” point-of-view. Great care was taken in setting up this 
experiment to make sure that information came across as distinct for each 
point-of-view, but not as hyperbole. For example, the “liberal” source 
describes the subjects of the executive order as “undocumented immigrants,” 
while the “neutral” source describes them as “illegal immigrants,” and the 
“conservative” source describes them as “illegal aliens.” Furthermore, other 
political scientists were consulted to make sure that each piece of content 
accurately reflects the intended tone of its source (i.e. that “MSNBC” content 
sounds like MSNBC). 
In accordance with the hypotheses, the assigned treatments are 
expected to produce the following results: 
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S1 & S3: These treatments should produce the greatest change in one’s 
strength of opinion, with people who identify as partisans shifting further to 
their respective ideologies, and people who identify as independents shifting 
slightly toward a liberal point-of-view if exposed to S1 or a conservative point-
of-view if exposed to S3. This is because both of these treatments are 
ideological tweets, and research suggests that tweets encourage polarizing 
behaviors more than articles, and that ideological pieces of information 
change a respondent’s attitude about a given issue more than neutral or 
apolitical pieces. Moreover, opposing-party information (Democrats 
consuming Fox News tweets or Republicans consuming MSNBC tweets) is 
expected to have a bigger effect than in-party information since the impulse 
for many people is to focus on the opposite party’s flaws instead of his own 
party’s strengths (Levendusky 2013, 98). 
S5 & S7: These treatments should produce a meaningful change in one’s 
strength of opinion, with people who identify as partisans shifting slightly 
further to their respective ideologies, and people who identify as independents 
moving a little bit toward a liberal point-of-view if exposed to S5 or a 
conservative point-of-view if exposed to S7. The magnitude of these changes 
is expected to be less significant for exposure to articles than to tweets because 
articles require closer reading and are less digestible for the creation of quick 
opinions.   
S2 & S6:  These treatments should produce an appreciable, but not a 
dramatic change, in the strength of one’s opinion, with people who identify as 
partisans shifting slightly to their respective ideologies, and people who 
identify as independents moving hardly, if at all. This is because both S2 and 
S6 are politically neutral sources. So, while a respondent will glean what he 
wants from either the BBC tweets or article, his opinion should not alter in 
nearly the same degree as it would if exposed to ideological tweets or articles. 
S4 & S8:  These treatments have no conceivable effect on the strength of 
a person’s political opinions and therefore serve as baselines. 
To present the predictions another way, here is a ranking of the 
treatments, from most to least polarizing: 
 
(S1 & S3) > (S5 & S7) > (S2 & S6) > (S4 & S8) 
 
Outside of the randomly assigned treatments, each participant will 
answer two sets of questions. The first set of questions, asked before exposure, 
will assess (among other things) a respondent’s Internet usage and political 
self-identification. The second set of questions, asked after exposure, tests the 
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strength of a respondent’s political opinions and appraises a multitude of 
components to do with the treatment a respondent is exposed to. Minimal 
demographic information including age, gender, and level of education, will 
also be recorded (for complete survey information and a letter of approval for 
this research from CU-Boulder’s Institutional Review Board (IRB), please see 
the appendix). 
The user experience of this experiment is created using Qualtrics, an 
online data collection tool used by more than a thousand universities around 
the world for academic research (Qualtrics 2014). Respondents are driven to 
the experiment by the online job forum Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) 
and compensated $0.30 for their time. MTurk, founded in 2005 allows 
“requesters” to post Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) to be completed by an 
army of 500,000 crowdsourced workers (Marder 2015). When it comes to 
academic studies like this one, researchers have found that while MTurk users 
are younger and more ideologically liberal than the general public, relative to 
other convenience samples used in political science, MTurk users are often 
more representative of the general population and less expensive to recruit 
(Berinsky et al. 2012, 366). The experiment for this thesis, entitled “Internet 
and Politics Survey,” went live on MTurk during the morning of February 2, 
2015 and 2,008 responses were collected over the next two weeks. 
 
VII. DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Population Demographics 
 
 Consistent with the findings outlined in “Evaluating Online Labor 
Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk,” the 
population that participated in the experiment is substantially younger, more 
male, and more liberal than the general population of the United States. 
56.39 percent of respondents are between the ages of 18 and 30, 64.75 
percent of respondents identify themselves as male, and 46.81 percent of 
respondents identify themselves as Democrats while 18.73 percent identify as 
Republicans and 34.46 percent as political independents, respectfully. The 
population is also better educated than the United States as a whole, with 
91.23 percent of respondents reporting at least some college education, and 
49.45 percent having completed at least a bachelor’s degree. When it comes to 
voting, the most basic measure of political engagement, 70.99 percent of 
eligible voters in the experiment population report voting in the 2012 
presidential election, a full 9.18 points higher than the population of the 
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whole United States (File 2014, 3). The average person who participated in 
the experiment reports spending approximately five and a half hours every day 
using the Internet and gets 71.26 percent of their political information 
through the medium. This suggests that the population studied is Net-savvy 
and representative of the shift towards a digital-first information landscape. 
Finally, it may be of interest that participants in this experiment live very 
uniformly across the United States. A map of respondent locations may be 
found in the appendix. 
Like most every experiment in the social sciences, the results of this 
work are susceptible to criticism that they do not accurately reflect real world 
conditions. It is the author’s hope that the results below will be understood as 
a best attempt to describe natural phenomena using information gathered 
under necessarily artificial conditions. 
 
Concerning Hypothesis One 
 
 As a reminder, H1 is that exposure to pieces of information presented 
as tweets will change one’s political opinions to a greater and more extreme 
degree than exposure to pieces of information presented as articles. More 
exactly, the expectation is that political tweets will move a respondent’s rating 
of President Obama on the issue of immigration further away from the 
baseline established by apolitical information than political articles will. To 
test this hypothesis a Student’s t-test was performed in order to compare 
values of the dependent variable as they relate to the treatment administered 
to a group of respondents. The dependent variable is a 0-100 “thermometer” 
rating of President Obama regarding the issue of immigration and the 
independent variable is whether a group of respondents was exposed to 
information presented as tweets or information presented as an article. The 
test indicates that H1 cannot be confirmed as correct. The average rating 
among respondents exposed to tweets was 47.29 points and the average rating 
for those exposed to articles was 46.99 points, an insignificant difference. 
Statistically speaking, it breaks down to a t-statistic of 0.23 and a p-value of 
0.82, which are far from significant. 
 Two other measures of political polarization were tested in the same 
fashion and yielded similar results. In the first of these studies, the dependent 
variable was a respondent’s perceived polarization on a 0-100 thermometer, 
with a value of 0 indicating that the American political system is “not at all 
polarized,” and a value of 100 indicating that it is “more polarized than at any 
point in history.” When that value was run against the type of information a 
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respondent was exposed to, we find that the average rating among 
respondents exposed to tweets was 72.13 points and the average rating for 
those exposed to articles was 71.97 points, an insignificant difference. The t-
statistic for this test was 0.15 with a p-value of 0.88, again, not significant. 
 The final measure of political polarization tested against the type of 
information a respondent was exposed to, was a difference of a respondent’s 
thermometer ratings for both the Democratic and Republican parties. Simply, 
each person who completed the experiment was asked to rate his feelings of 
each party on a 0-100 scale. If, for example, someone rated Republicans at 80 
and Democrats at 20, his score for this variable would be 60. The idea is that 
an individual with a high score is a more extreme partisan than an individual 
with a lower score. After another Student’s t-test was run, we find that the 
average party difference for respondents exposed to tweets was 34.40 points 
and the average rating for those exposed to articles was 35.89 points. The t-
statistic for this test was 1.18 with a p-value of 0.24, which, although closer 
than previous tests, was still not significant.  
 While disappointing that H1 could not be confirmed, these results 
should be taken with a grain of salt. For the purposes of the experiment, it 
was essential that the amount of content did not vary across treatment groups. 
In a real-life scenario articles are considerably longer and usually more 
nuanced than presented in the experiment. Consequently, an “article” in the 
experiment functioned very similarly to a collection of five tweets. While the 
results here indicate no reason to believe that there is a significant difference 
between consuming information as articles as opposed to tweets in term of 
polarization effects, future studies would benefit from a method that better 
captures the relevant differences between information sources while still 
rendering them comparable. For example, a long-term study in a controlled 
environment where participants are repeatedly exposed to either only tweets 
or only articles may tease out differences that this experiment was unable to.   
 
Concerning Hypothesis Two 
 
 As a reminder, H2 is that irrespective of format, exposure to 
ideologically filtered pieces of information will change one’s political opinions 
to a greater and more extreme degree than exposure to neutral pieces of 
information. To test this hypothesis an analysis of variance (ANOVA) model 
was run. Again, the dependent variable was a 0-100 “thermometer” rating of 
President Obama for the issue of immigration, and this time the independent 
variable was the author/source of the information (MSNBC, BBC World 
	   21 
News, Fox News, ESPN). The model generated a statistically significant 
relationship (f-value of 4.23 and p-value of 0.01) meaning that there are some 
differences regarding how people evaluate President Obama depending on the 
source of information they are exposed to. 
Running a simple table produces the following findings: individuals 
who were exposed to information written by MSNBC, the “liberal” source, 
rated President Obama’s handling of immigration issues at 49.76 points, 
those exposed to BBC World News, the “neutral” source, gave a rating of 
48.96 points, those exposed to Fox News, the “conservative” source, gave a 
rating of 45.91 points, and those exposed to ESPN, the “apolitical” source, 
gave a rating of 43.99 points. These results (displayed in Fig. 1) are very 
interesting. Since treatments were randomly assigned, these numbers 
demonstrate that 700 characters of content can have a nearly six-point impact 
on how an individual feels about a given political issue.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Effect of Author on Immigration Thermometer Rating  
 
In an effort to see if source differences extend to issues other than the one 
discussed in the content consumed (immigration), respondents were asked to 
complete thermometer rating for President Obama on four others: jobs and 
the economy; education; health care; and energy and the environment. For no 
single issue other than immigration did exposure to specific sources of 
information produce a difference that was even close to statistically 
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significant. A variable was then created for the average rating of the five issues 
taken together for each respondent. When that measure was run as the 
dependent variable against the author/source of the information exposed to, 
there was no statistically significant relationship present (f-value of 0.38 and 
p-value of 0.76). This means that exposure to a specific of information does 
not subconsciously effect a reader’s interpretation of issues not discussed in 
the writing. In other terms, being exposed to information from MSNBC 
about only Issue A will not cause a viewer to change their opinions to be more 
liberal on Issues B, C, etc.  
 All of the results discussed so far are meaningful, but they have yet to 
confirm or deny H2. To fully assess the polarizing power of a source of 
information, partisan affiliations must be interacted with. Otherwise, analysis 
can only be performed on a sample where opposing viewpoints offset each 
other. To include party identification, an additional ANOVA model is run 
with a thermometer rating of President Obama on immigration as the 
dependent variable, and both the author/source and respondent’s political 
party identification as interacting independent variables. That model 
produced results that indicate there is not a statistically significant interaction.  
Nevertheless, This is fascinating because as the graph of results (at the 
end of this paragraph) showing the interaction of the variables indicates, 
partisans of all stripes are influenced in the same direction by each 
author/source of information, with information from MSNBC leading to the 
highest intraparty rating of President Obama on immigration, followed 
closely by BBC World News, then Fox News, before finally, ESPN. From 
this information we are able to reject the anticipated findings described in H2 
that ideologically filtered pieces of information would be more polarizing than 
politically neutral information because in every instance, information from the 
neutral source (BBC World News) moved respondents’ ratings further away 
from the baseline set by information from the apolitical source (ESPN) than 
information from one of the ideological sources (Fox News). 
As Fig. 2 makes plain, the issue of immigration is very polarizing, with 
the average Democratic respondent assigning President Obama a rating of 
60.60 points, which is 17.01 points more favorable than independents, and a 
full 40.51 points more favorable than Republicans. These partisan differences 
are evident across all five issues surveyed, with similar margins. 
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Figure 2. Effect of Author on Immigration Thermometer Rating by Party 
 
Additional Findings 
 
Outside of the main hypotheses about issue polarization, there are 
many worthwhile results from this experiment that deserve comment. One 
such result is the difference between being exposed to tweets or articles and 
the amount of time a respondent spends viewing the information. The 
expectation coming into this experiment was that people spend less time 
looking at information that is displayed as tweets than information that is 
displayed as an article. The motivating factor here is that tweets are 
necessarily standalone and cannot be read fluidly like sentences in a 
paragraph. This makes it so a person interacting with tweets must discard the 
last bit of information they consumed and bounce around without a 
connecting thread. In an article however, there is a narrative aspect that 
demands attention and a close reading. After removing outliers in the data to 
account for instances where people left their browser window open with the 
treatment information while multitasking, etc., a statistically significant 
difference is found, with an f-value of 165.58 and a p-value of 0.00. As 
visualized in Fig. 3, the average viewer spent 20.99 seconds reading five 
tweets, and 29.58 seconds reading the 700-character article, meaning that 
people spend over 40 percent longer reading the same amount of information 
when it is presented as an article instead of as tweets.  
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Figure 3. Effect of Format on Time Spent Viewing Content  
 
Another interesting result that is dependent on the format of the 
information presented is the trust a respondent has in their source. One 
would expect that a source is trusted because it is factually accurate or has a 
track record of impartial coverage, and in theory, those criteria should apply 
across all different mediums, from television to print, radio to online. Yet, 
that was not the case in this experiment. A bivariate ANOVA model 
confirms as much. In the experiment questionnaire, participants were asked if 
they felt the source they were exposed to was fair and accurate in reporting, 
with two options: “yes,” and “no.” With all of those answers averaged 
together, we see that information presented as an article is trusted 79.30 
percent of the time, 12.57 points higher than information presented as tweets. 
However the real story is found one layer deeper. In today’s fragmented media 
market, trust in a source of political information would seem dependent on a 
person’s partisanship—as much is confirmed by running an interactive 
ANOVA model. When the information is graphed, some curious things 
appear (see Fig. 4). The numbers on the x-axis of the graph correspond to the 
matrix displayed in the research design of this paper, with, for example, “1” 
meaning exposure to tweets from MSNBC, and “7” meaning exposure to an 
article from Fox News. The most striking result is that Democrats and 
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independents thoroughly distrusted tweets from Fox News, but found articles 
from Fox News much more reliable even though the content is identical. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Effect of Source Type on Source Trust by Party 
 
We can only speculate as to why this is the case, but one possibility is 
the “framing effect” as advanced in the book The Paradox of Choice. The effect 
is such that differences in the presentation of information can dramatically 
impact the ways in which people interact with that material (Schwartz 2005, 
64). On its face, this explanation still fails to articulate why Fox News tweets 
were so distrusted compared to tweets from other sources, but the theory is a 
place to start. An additional point of interest is that Republican respondents 
did not have any similar extreme swings of distrust. Looking at responses 
from political independents it is encouraging to see that when it comes to 
political information, the neutral source (BBC World News) was trusted 
more highly than either of the ideologically filtered sources (MSNBC and 
Fox News). Also, ESPN scored nearly perfectly on the trust scale, which is 
expected, and indicates that respondents were taking the survey seriously. Just 
comparing the author/source of information and respondents’ trust in that 
source, we find that ESPN was trusted by 92.90 percent of the respondents 
who were exposed to it, BBC World News was trusted by 85.00 percent, 
MSNBC was trusted by 68.67 percent, and Fox News was trusted by 45.13 
percent. 
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This next evaluation gets at the point of news: to learn information 
about the world. In the post-treatment survey participants were asked to 
answer how many people President Obama’s action on immigration applies 
to, and given multiple choices in increments of three million, from zero up to 
a total of twelve. In every source of political information a number between 
three and six million was stated. Post-collection, answers were recoded 
binomially indicating either a correct or incorrect answer. When an ANOVA 
model is run with those correct answers as the dependent variable and both 
the author/source and format of information as interacting independent 
variables, everything is statistically significant. Levels of learning are exhibited 
in Fig. 5 below. 
 
 
  
Figure 5. Effect of Format on Learning by Author 
 
What’s strange is that while all of the groups exposed to political 
information knew more than those exposed to apolitical information, far and 
away, more people learned information by reading the Fox News article than 
from any other source. There is even a nearly 20-point difference between the 
article and the Fox News tweets that have the exact same information. In 
part, this is because the title of the Fox News article contained a value that 
was an answer to the question. This supports the idea that readers pay more 
attention to information in a title than in the body of a text. Compounding 
the intrigue is what we find when we look at respondents’ interest in the 
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information they consumed. No matter how the data are sliced, respondents 
(not accounting for party identification) are less interested in the topic of 
immigration when they encounter information from Fox News (64.61 percent 
interest) than from either MSNBC (76.31 percent) or BBC World News 
(74.80 percent). The same statistically significant rank ordering emerges when 
instead of interest, desire to learn more about the topic of immigration is 
tested. Once again, the average person who encountered information from 
Fox News had a low desire to learn more (48.70 percent) relative to those who 
were exposed to information from MSNBC (63.05 percent) or BBC World 
News (62.00 percent). All of this points to a rather remarkable finding that 
even though respondents who were exposed to information from Fox News 
consequently had the lowest levels of both interest in immigration and desire 
to learn more about it, they ended up coming away having retained the most 
information. 
 Using data from the experiment, there is still another statistically 
significant relationship that speaks to today’s partisan atmosphere. Political 
campaigns, where the goal is to polarize mobilize a base, are especially fertile 
grounds for one-sided messaging. Participants in the experiment were asked if 
they took part in a number of different political actions in the past year—
during which time a midterm election happened—and those responses were 
interacted with the type of content a person was exposed to, tweets or an 
article, and compared to the party rating difference dependent variable that 
was defined earlier. When ANOVA models were run, outcomes for the 
interacted independent variables were insignificant for each political action 
except for one: working or volunteering for a political party or candidate, 
which had an f-value of 4.12 and a p-value of 0.04. This makes sense, because 
as authors discussed in the “Polarization Theories” section of this thesis claim, 
it is the active partisans that are most likely to be polarized, and investing 
time in a political campaign surely qualifies one as being “active.” In this 
author’s experience on the digital team of a major 2014 campaign, the news 
cycle is now tweet-based, and the easier something is to synthesize and form 
an opinion about, the better. As David Axelrod, senior political consultant 
and message maven for both Obama presidential campaigns puts it, “yes, you 
follow Twitter and you’re aware that any little event somewhere could hijack a 
day’s news” (NPR 2015). That thought process helps explain Fig. 6 showing 
that campaign workers who were exposed to tweets had a nearly 15-points 
greater difference in their thermometer ratings of Democrats and Republicans 
than campaign workers who were exposed to articles. 
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Figure 6. Effect of Format on Polarization by Campaign Work 
 
 Further confirming these findings, when the dependent variable was 
switched from party rating difference to perceived polarization, statistical 
significance remained (f-value of 4.10 and p-value of 0.04). The pattern was 
nearly identical too, with respondents who were not involved with a campaign 
experiencing just about a point of difference in their perceived polarization 
ratings if exposed to either tweets or an article, while those who were involved 
with a campaign perceiving polarization to be 9.50 points greater when 
exposed to tweets instead of an article. 
 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
 
One of the definite limitations of this thesis is that the Internet is being 
treated as a one-way communications platform where users only consume 
information, but are not content creators themselves. Clearly, this is 
unrealistic for many people, as one of the core premises of social media like 
Twitter is that users write their own posts to express opinions. Still, it should 
not be lost just how influential the passive use of sites such as Twitter can be 
on shaping political beliefs. As discussed above and represented by Fig. 1, 
exposure to even as few as five tweets or a single 700-character article can 
have an immediate impact on the favorability of certain policies for a given 
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individual. Although it was not empirically tested in this paper, the self-
selectivity of Internet news sources and the algorithms within search engines 
can lead to repeated instances of these seemingly insignificant 700-character 
bits of information. Over time, this is how identities are developed and 
hardened. It should be noted, however, that technology does not change 
human nature. Even in the days before the Internet and 24/7 cable news, 
consumers craved information that fell in line with their beliefs. Today it’s 
just easier to get it than ever before. 
Objectively, the experiment proved to be successful. While the ultimate 
conclusion of this work is that being presented with information as tweets 
instead of articles does not make a significant difference in terms of political 
polarization, there remain many meaningful and novel results from the 
project. Looking at the differences between tweets and articles, the evidence 
suggests that people generally spend more time reading information when it is 
presented as an article and find that information to be more trustworthy. The 
formatting of information also matters for certain groups in the population 
like campaign workers who have a greater familiarity with certain sources. 
Curiously, differences between authors of information seem to be reserved for 
Fox News, with tweets from the source being heavily distrusted by Democrats 
and independents, but the article outperforming all other sources when it 
came to teaching respondents factual information. 
Just as this work has engaged with the topic of the Internet and politics 
in a way that is unique to the medium, future scholars would be wise to 
embrace the properties that make it distinct from other means of building 
relationships. This is an exciting time to do research about the topic, when 
media is rich with potentially powerful and practical discoveries that can 
inform elected officials how to better serve their constituents, galvanize issue 
groups to make their voices heard, and cause everyday citizens to abandon a 
comfortable consensus in favor of personal growth. Fractured politics can only 
survive for so long before it becomes apparent that we must work together to 
solve problems and achieve the promise of America herself: out of many, one. 
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